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Summary:
This paper argues that intraindustry trade with developed countries is an important source of
technology transfer, and creates incentives to climb up the learning curve. South Africa has
an industrial structure that could be suited to such trade, but high costs and weak social
capacity to assimilate technology are an impediment to productivity growth. Therefore,
reintegration into the world economy is likely to reinforce dependence on resource-intensive
industries. In the short run this need not adversely affect economic growth, but unless the
quality and quantity of education are improved, the prospects for rebuilding the technological
capacity and catch up with OECD countries are bleak.
Sammendrag:
Handel med industrivarer innenfor en bransje er en viktig kilde til teknologi overføringer. I
tillegg skaper slik handel konkurranse og incentiver til produktivitetesvekst. Sør-Afrika har
en industristruktur som er egnet til såkalt intraindustriell handel med industrilandene, men
høye kostnader of lav kapasitet til å assimilere ny teknologi hindrer produktivitetsveksten som
er nødvendig for å hevde seg i slik konkurranse. Derfor er det sannsyling at Sør-Afrika vil
bli mer avhengig av sin ressursbaserte industri når landet igjen deltar i verdenshandelen på like
vilkår med andre land. På kort sikt trenger ikke dette være en bremse på den økonomiske
veksten. På lengre sikt er det imidlertid helt nødvendig å øke kapasiteten til å assimilere
teknologi, først og fremst gjennom et bedre utdanningssystem, for å kunne generere inntekst-
og produktivitetsvekst.
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L. Introduction1
The economy remains dependent on mineral exports, and the manufacturing sector cannot
create jobs, meet the basic needs of the majority or compete on world markets (ANC 1994:
76).
With sanctions lifted, as a signatory to the new GATT agreement and a member
of SADC, South Africa is about to be reintegrated into the regional as well as the
world economy. After decades of protectionist trade policy, initially conceived of
as a strategy for industrialisation and later to some extent designed to counteract
international sanctions, reintegration poses a challenge to South Africa to
massively restructure the economy. Reintegration means lower trade bariers and
therefore increased competition from low-wage neighbouring countries as well as
Asian emerging economies at the labour-intensive, low-technology end of the
product range. At the medium- to high-technology end, competition from the fast-
growing Asian "tigers" and the OECD countries wil increase both on domestic
and regional markets. Finally, the entry of the former Soviet Union onto the world
market has had an immense impact on commodity markets.
Trade and industrial policy are closely linked. Industrial policy measures often
have a distortive effect on trade, and are therefore increasingly regulated by
international agreements. In South Africa there is an ongoing debate on how to
adapt to such regulations. A majority of those taking part in the debate is cautious
about further liberalising trade (Bell 1993; Hirsch 1993), but realises that
implementation ofthe GATT agreement inevitably means scaling down protection
of domestic industries. To avoid a shakeout in key industries, it is suggested that
South Africa should seek to be classified as a developing country by the World
Trade Organisation (WTO), and request a longer transitionar period due to South
Africa' s special position. A broad consensus on the importance of the Southern
African region as a market for the South African manufacturing sector has
emerged (Tjønneland 1992; African Development Bank 1993), but South African
scholars as well as the business community are cautious about what can be
expected from regional integration (Leistner 1992; Maasdorp and Whiteside 1993;
Davies 1993 and 1994). Institutional weaknesses, similar output structures and
shortage of foreign exchange on the part of non-SACU countries in the region are
pointed out as constraints on increasing intra-regional trade. 
2 In addition,
restructuring of national economies is thought to be a prerequisite for successful
This research was conducted during my stay as a visiting fellow at the Institute for SocIal and
Economic Research (ISER) at University of Durban-Westvile, South AfrIca. I would like to
thank the staff at ISER for their hospitality and support. Special thanks to Dr. Vishnu
Padayachee for helpful comments and to the Norwegian Research Council for financial support.
2 The members of SACU (Southern African Customs Union) are Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia,
South Africa and Swaziland.
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regional cooperation (Nomvete 1993). In this paper the implicit notion in much of
the debate that imports are bad but exports are good for development is opposed.
Instead the importance of trade as such as a source of technology, incentives and
as a vehicle for development is emphasised. Further, I take a somewhat different
approach to the issue at stake. Insights from the new trade and growth theories are
combined, and trade and industrial policy are seen in the light of these theories.3
To do so, South African data are organised according to the OECD classification
adopted in the OECD industrial policy reviews. This facilitates a richer analysis
of competitiveness, comparative advantage and the gains from trade than what is
possible within the framework of traditional analysis of relative abundance of
capital and labour, which in turn gives the somewhat confusing result that South
Africa's competitive advantage lies in relatively capital-intensive industries, and
the least capital-intensive industries (Levy 1992). My approach and results are
briefly summarised as follows:
The manufacturing sector is analysed along three dimensions, wage costs,
technology and orientation. The focus is particularly on productivity performance
and competitiveness in order to assess the manufacturing sector' s ability to
generate income and accumulate technological capacity in a more liberal trade
regime. It goes without saying that competitive, high-technology industries
generate the highest income, while they are a drain on resources if not
competitive. It is found that South Africa' s competitiveness lies mainly in
resource-intensive and low-technology industries. Trade liberalisation wil therefore
initiate a reallocation of resources towards these industries. South Africa also has
a potential for competitive labour-intensive industries if the rise in unit labour
costs could be arrested or reversed. However, South Africa does not possess a
sufficient stock of human capita! to take advantage of better market access in
high-technology industries. Even medium-technology industries may be in danger.
A decline in such industries wil undoubtedly lower the technological capacity of
the economy, but South Africa is likely to benefit from other, more temporary
sources of productivity growth like unexploited economies of scale and resource
rent. Should South Africa seek trade concessions in order to maintain its
technological capacity? I argue that beyond seeking recognition as a developing
country by the WTO, it should not. The reason is that the cheapest and most
important source of technology is the OECD area, and an important channel of
technology transfer is trade as such, not only exports. However, a significant stock
of human capital is required even for adopting foreign technology. Therefore, it
is argued that scarce resources are better spent on education and training than
subsidising or protecting high-technology industries.
3 Holden (1993) briefly discusses the relevance of this approach to South Africa. Otherwise we
have not found studies within this framework in South Africa.
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IThe paper is organised as follows: Section 2 sets out the analytical framework
which is based on elements from the product cycle theory of trade as developed
by Vernon (1966) and Krugman (1979), a model of intraindustry trade (Krugman
1981) and a model of technological diffusion developed by Grossman and
Helpman (1991). Such an approach misses some important institutional and social
factors that determine competitiveness and trade, but here I refer to a large body
of previous research. In section 3, the South African manufacturing sector is
classified along three dimensions: wage costs, technology and orientation. Section
4 continues with a brief description of the present structure of trade and
specialisation within the OECD, the Southern African region and between the two
areas. The description is followed by speculations about likely future development
in this structure depending on the trade regime adopted, and implications for
economic growth. Finally, conclusions are drawn in section 5.
2. Analytical framework
2.1 Comparative advantage and trade patterns
The marvel of comparative advantage is that everybody possesses it. According
to neoclassical trade theory, free trade and specialisation in line with comparative
advantage improve efficiency in worldwide resource allocation and makes
everybody better off. This is, however, a static gain which raises the overall leve!
of production. Taking dynamic aspects into account, some countries may gain
substantially more than others. It has been suggested that if some industries have
lower potential for growth through technological pro gress than others, countries
having comparative advantage for such low-technology, mature industries at one
point in time wil be locked into a lower growth path than countries having
comparative advantages for high-technology industries at the same point in time
if both countries specialise according to comparative advantage (Lucas 1988).
A somewhat different trade pattern found mainly among developed countries is
intra-industry trade. Such trade takes place between countries with similar factor
or re source endowments, and depends on the existence of unexhausted economies
of scale. By producing only a subset of the range of goods produced by the
industry in question, and trading these varieties with other countries producing a
different subset, all trading countries gain by exploiting scale economies.
Moreover , consurners are offered a broader variety of products at lesser cost than
what would have been the case with only interindustry trade (see Krugman 1981).
Product differentiation may occur along the horizontal or the vertical dimension,
the latter often referred to as a quality ladder. The former tends to be found in
trade among developed countries in medium- and high-technology industries and
facilitates economic growth through a larger variety of intermediate products, as
shown by Grossman and Helpman (1990), and through incentives provided by
3
i
-I
competition. The product cycle theory is concerned with differentiation along the
vertical dimension, and is mainly found in North-South trade. Product cycle
models usually assurne that innovation of new products takes place in developed
countries and that the technology eventually becomes known to developing
countries who imitate and produce them at lower cost. In some cases several
qualities of a product may coexist in the market. In other cases a new quality
renders all previous versions obsolete. After a product has been imitated and
produced at lower costs in the South, the North can recapture the entire market or
parts of it by new innovations moving further up the quality ladder. Such a
product cycle facilitates economic growth in the South through technology transfer
represented by the opportunity to imitate at a lower cost than the cost of
innovation, and in the North through the incentive to innovate represented by
temporar monopoly rent and the danger of losing the market to potential low-cost
imitators (see Krugman (1979) and Grossman and Helpman (1991)).
In this paper both aspects of intraindustry trade are discussed, but let us first
elaborate on Lucas' point on comparative advantage and growth in the South
African context:
For mineral or oil-exporting countries, Lucas' point is of particular relevance, as
extracting minerals or oil is not only of relatively low technology, but also subject
to diminishing returns to scale in the long run as resources are depleted. Moreover,
high, but volatile export earnings from minerals tend to create an uncompetitive
environment for tradeables in other sectors of the economy, a phenomenon often
referred to as the "Dutch disease". A characteristic symptom is the reallocation of
resources towards non-traded goods and service sectors, and of course to the
natural resource exploiting sector, including downstream activities, usually in
vertically integrated mining companies.
The African National Congress description of South Africa's competitive position
quoted above looks like a diagnosis of this disease. The ilness' initial stage
includes a real appreciation of the exchange rate due to persistent surpluses on the
current account of the balance of payment. As lon g as the real price of the
commodity in question and the leve! of output in the natural resource extracting
sector is sustained, the disease causes no pain. To the contrary, windfall mineral
revenue enables the country to enjoy a relatively high standard of living, and
hence rising domestic consumption. However, when prices or output leve! start to
decline, the economy might find itself burdened by an industrial structure that is
not capable of maintaining the leve! of per-capita income achieved during the
booming periodof the mineral sector (Corden and Neary 1982; Corden 1984 and
Krugman 1987).
As far as the level of income and competitiveness of manufacturing industries are
concerned, the Dutch disease syndrome corresponds well with the South African
experience. The real exchange rate followed the swings of the dollar gold price
4
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closely during the 1980s, although with greater flexibility downwards than
upwards (Kahn 1992). Other sectors of the economy, therefore, faced frequently
changing international competitiveness for reasons over which they had no control.
In spite of this, rather than allocating resources to sectors producing non-
tradeables, South Africa has developed a sizable manufacturing sector, to a large
extent behind a protective tariff wall and other import barriers. Thus, while
manufacturing output as a share of GDP has declined in most other mineral- or
oil-exporting countries during the period 1970 to 1991, the share has remained
stable at 24-25 percent in South Africa (World Bank 1993). A large share of the
manufacturing sector is, however, strongly linked to the mining sector, constituting
the minerals-energy complex (see Jourdan (1993) for a discussion).
Maintaining a relatively large manufacturing sector in the face of better investment
opportunities elsewhere in the economy (see figure 2.1) can be justified by the
objective of creating comparative advantage for at least medium-technology
industries, which in turn would contribute to sustaining the income leve! from the
era of booming mineral incomes.4 Comparative advantage in a particular industry
simply means having relatively abundant supply of the factor intensively used in
that industry. Therefore, creating comparative advantage could be achieved by
investing heavily in the relevant factor, or assets that can easily be transforrned
into this factor. However, when skils are the factor of production intensively used,
and skils are accumulated through learning by doing, then the industry in question
has to be established to create comparative advantage. In this case, industries that
are crowded out by the mining sector wil not return when minerals are exhausted,
and the Dutch disease becomes a problem for long-run growth (Krugman 1987).
2.2 Industry classification
In order to analyse trade patterns focusing on competitiveness and dynamic aspects
of specialisation, it is useful to categorise industries along the following three
dimensions:
* labour costs (wages)
* technology
* orientation
4 There are better measures ofreturn on investment than the dividend percentage, but at this stage
I do not have sufficient data.
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Following OECD (1993) categorisation along the first two dimensions gives the
matrix presented in table 2.1.5
Table 2.1
Wage and technology
Wage (column)/ High Medium Low G7 share
Technology of world
(row) exports
(1990) %
High Aerospace, Scientific Electrical 81.6
Computers and instruments, machinery
office equipment, Communication
Pharmaceuticals equipment and
semIconductors
Medium Chemicals Rubber and plastics, Other transport 76.2
excluding drugs, Non-ferrous metals, equipment,
Motor vehicles Non-electrical Other
machinery manufacturing
Low Petroleum refining Paper and printing, Food, 63.1
Non-metallc beverages and
mineral products, tobacco,
Iron and steel, Textiles,
Metal products, apparel and
Shipbuilding leather, W ood
products
Source: OECD (1993). Classification according to wage was made for 9 OECD countries in 1985,
but is according the OECD representative for the OECD area and for an extensive period.
High technology and high wage usually go together, but not always, as can be
seen in this table. The outlayers are petroleum refining which is high-wage, low-
technology and electrical machinery which is low-wage, high-technology. High
wages in petroleum refining can be explained by the fact that it is a strongly
resource-based, downstream activity by the major oil companies, and as such
enjoys its share of the oil rent. In addition it is among the most capital intensive
industries in the economy. The other outlayer, electrical machinery, is high-
technology, but the technology is to a large extent embodied in standardised
components which are assembled by medium-skilled labour, of ten in low-cost
countries.
The third dimension determining competitiveness, i.e. orientation, c1assifies
industries according to the factor of production relatively intensively used, or the
characteristics of the sector that affects competitiveness the most:
5 All data in this section are based on OECD (1993) unless otherwise stated.
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Table 2.2
Manufacturing by orientation
Factor Industry G7 share of
world exports,
1990, %
N atural resource Food beverages and tobacco, W ood 58.2
products, Petroleum refining, Non-
metallic mineral products, Non-
ferrous metals
Labour Textiles, appareI and leather, 66.8
Fabricated metal products, Other
manufacturing
Scale Paper and printing, Chemicals 76
excluding drugs, Rubber and plastics,
Iran and steel, Shipbuilding, Motor
vehic1es, Other transport equipment
Specialization Non-electrical machinery, Electrical 80
( differentiated machinery, Communication
products) equipment and semiconductors,
Science Aerospace, Computers, 80.1
Pharmaceuticals, Scientific
instruments
Source: OECD (1993)
When comparing table 2.1 and 2.2, it emerges that high wages go together with
science-oriented, scale intensive or natural resource-based industries. Hence, high
wages can be supported by high productivity either through accumulation of
human capital as in the science-based, high-technology industries, low labour share
of total costs as in the scale intensive industries, or through rent in the resource-
based industries. The limited number of industries in which low labour costs are
the most important competitive factor is noteworthy.
In a long-term dynamic perspective, scale economies get exhausted, while rent on
natural resources is dependent on volatile world market commodity prices. Income
growth in long- run, full-employment equilbrium, therefore, is stable and
sustainable only if technological progress is an important part of it.6
6 Full employment is admittedly is a far cry from South African reality. There is therefore scope
for income growth through absorbing idle workers in formal employment. However, in this and
forthcoming papers it wil nevertheless be argued that technological progress is of immense
importance to the development of the economy.
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2.3 Technological progress
Technological progress takes place through two different channels that are not
always easily discernable. One is research and development (R&D) in separate
industrial or university laboratories. The outcome of R&D is usually new products
and processes that are either complements to previously produced goods or
existing processes, or substitutes to them. The other channel for technological
pro gress is incremental improvement of existing goods and processes that to a
large extent takes place on the shop floor as a result of learning by doing.
Improved goods are substitutes to existing variants. Sometimes quality-improved
variants are perfect substitutes to existing ones, which in practice means that the
new product wil render previous versions obsolete. Being able to adopt new
versions quickly in such dynamic industries is therefore extremely important
merely to stay in business. This is the case for companies in a microeconomic
context as well as for industries of a country in an international trade context.
When several versions of a product are traded at the same time, earlIer versions
trade at a discount if new versions are of better quality. This point is highly
relevant to the motor vehicle industry in South Africa which is inc1ined to produce
a particular model for a longer time than overseas competitors (Black 1993).
The R&D channel for technological progress is costly, human capital intensive and
fraught with uncertainty. At the outset, investors in R&D have only a vague idea
of the properties and potential use of the new product.7 Whether the laboratory
wil be able to come up with a marketable product design is uncertain, and if and
when it does, any company with sufficient skill and capacity could imitate the
product at a lower co st as captured by the product cyc1e theory brie fly discussed
in section 2.1.8 To avoid this disincentive to invest in R&D, rules for protection
of intellectual property rights have been developed and included in the new GATT
agreement. These property rights are, however, not likely to hamper technological
progress through imitation in less- and semi-developed countries. Firstly, patents
are perceived as an important obstac1e to technology diffusion only in a few
industries, i.e. pharmaceuticals and some other subsectors within the chemical
industry. Secondly, licensing is widespread, and usually provides sufficient
opportunity to adopt advanced technology without impeding the incentive to
innovate.9 This is paricularly the case when comprehensive training is part of the
licensing agreement.
These characteristics ofR&D-driven technological progress determine the structure
and location of related industries. Firstly, the costs and the risk of R&D and the
7 See Rosenberg (1993) for a discussion.
8 These characteristics resemble those of large-scale mining. Exploration and extraction costs are
high and irreversible, while the cash flow from mining is uncertain because of large fluctuations
in world market prices, and development of synthetie substitutes to the minerals.
9 See Rosenberg et aL. (1992) for a discussion.
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intellectual property rights facilitate concentration in large, and usually
multinational companies. Moreover, imperfect information related to R&D projects
puts smaller firms at a disadvantage in raising funds for such costly and uncertain
projects.1O Secondly, both the R&D activity itself and production of new goods
are human capital intensive. Thirdly, the share of high-technology products in
domestic demand seems to be an increasing function of GDP per capita. A fourth
factor con sti tuting astrong R&D driving force in countries like the USA, the
former Soviet Union and South Africa, is the military-industrial complex.
Comparative advantage in R&D-driven industries, therefore, is related to a relative
abundance of human capital, a well-developed credit market or strong government
involvement to diversify the risk associated with R&D, high income per capita and
probably an active R&D policy faciltating cooperation between university-based
or possibly defence-related basic research and industrial R&D. These
characteristics constitute the rationale for assuming that innovations of new
products take place in the North only in product cycle theories.
The potential of technological progress through the other channel, learning by
doing, is greatest for relatively new products and processes, or at least new
varieties of established products and processes. It is typically assumed that the
learning-curve in producing a specific good or introducing a new production
process is s-shaped. Very early in the product cycle, experience with the product
or process is low and learning is more related to establishing routines for
production than improving them or the product. Once a comprehensive under-
standing of the process and a more widespread use of the product are achieved,
the ineremental improvement process accelerates until the product and the process
become more or less standardised. At that stage the product is no longer as human
capital-intensive as it was at the outset. Increasingly, the price of the product, and
therefore costs are the most important competitive factor. Moreover, the learning
curve levels off at different levels in different industries. Thus, as the product
cyc1e unfolds, science is replaced by specialisation or scale as the most important
factor determining competitiveness. Eventually relatively low labour costs become
the major competitive factor. Somewhere along this trajectory production is moved
from the innovating country to a country that has relative abundance of the factor
which determines competitiveness at a later stage. The earlier in the product cycle
a country's firms are able to adopt a product and introduce it successfully in
domestic and foreign markets, the greater the scope for generating relatively well-
paid jobs. Conversely, a còuntry that only has the capacity to take up production
10 The paralleI to mIning is again striking. In order to raise capital for risky projects and spread
the risk, large mIning houses with interests in several economic sectors developed in South
Africa. Moreover, due to huge fluctuations in cash flow, a relatively sophisticated financial
sector emerged. This sector is to an increasing degree inc1uded in the tradeable par of the
economy, and South Africa has probably developed a comparative advantage in this sector (see
Jones and Muller 1992).
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of standardised, mature products is bound to compete mainly in terms of labour
costs or scale efficiency.
In most industries technological progress takes place through a combination of
R&D and learning by doing; new products and major improvements of existing
ones are developed in the research laboratories and improved through learning-by-
doing processes on the shop floor. Introducing existing, possibly modified products
or processes to laggard countries can take either route as R&D can be applied to
imitation or adoption as well as to innovation of products or processes. Generally,
capacity for imitation and for moving up the learning curve is strongly related to
the skil leve! among the R&D staff as well as among managers and workers.
The OECD countries have been able to increase the income leve! through
continuous structural change within the manufacturing sector, a change
characterised by movement from labour-intensive, lo w-technology and resource-
based industries to high- and medium- technology, and scale- and science-based
industries (OECD 1993). This development is also seen within industries. Hence,
by improving productivity through technological progress, exploiting economies
of scale and introducing more efficient ways of organising manufacturing
activities, income and real wages have risen. Parallei to this structural change
within the manufacturing sector, the share of manufacturing in total GDP has
steadily dec1ined in most OECD countries since the 1970s, to the advantage of the
more labour intensive tertiary sectorY
In accordance with the product cycle approach and other models of technology
diffusion, empirical evidence suggests that there may be some advantage of
backwardness in terms of the possibility of rapid catch-up growth, assuming that
the cost of imitation is less than the cost of innovation. However, if the technology
gap exceeds a critical value, this assumption may not hold, and the gap seems to
widen rather than trigger a spurt in economic growth (Nelson and Wright 1992;
Dowrick and Gemmell 1991).i What this critical value is, has not been
established, and there are not even established methods for measuring it. In
product cyc1e models the problem usually does not arise, since it is assumed that
while countries in the North are the only ones that innovate, countries in the South
have a gift for imitation, disregarding the possibility that innovation and imitation
are two sides of the same coin. Nevertheless, a critical technology gap is likely to
11 Measured at current prices, the manufacturing share of aDP declined in all the major OECD
countries between 1970 and 1990. However, measured at constant 1985 prices the share actually
increased in USA, Japan and Italy. The difference between the two measures is explained by
declining relative prices of the manufacturing sector.
12 This goes straight into the convergence debate in economic growth theory. Consensus seems
to have emerged that absolute convergence is contrary to empirical evidence, while relative
convergence is accepted as an empirical fact. This means, in turn, that the further a country is
below its own steady state growth path, the faster it wil grow.
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vary among countries, depending on, among other things, economic structure. The
critical gap is, for example, likely to be narrower in countries whose income is to
a large extent based on extraction of natural resources than in countries whose
income is based on producing low-cost, low-technology manufactures for a
competitive market. The reasons are that the latter industries expose a larger share
of the workforce to industrial practices, and the human and physical capital
accumulated through labour-intensive, low-technology industries are probably less
sector-specific than the capital accumulated through mineral-based industries.
Therefore, it is probably easier to develop medium-technology industries producing
goods and services for which demand is income elastic from a base of low-
technology, labour-intensive industries. To put it differently, the transformation
costs are probably higher in mineral-based economies.
2.4 Technological progress in South Africa
The product -cyc1e approach assurnes that the main source of technological
progress in developing countries is the learning-by-doing channel, supported by
R&D to adapt products to local markets and processes to local technological
capabilty. In South Africa, however, the R&D channel seems to dominate as a
source oftechnological progress. According to FRD (1993), most innovation takes
place in the R&D departments of large firms. The small share of incremental
innovations on the shop floor is probably related to a shortage of skilIs throughout
the manufacturing enterprise. In addition, hierarchical organisations leave little
scope for initiative at the shop floor (see also section 3).
R&D expenditure was 1.04 percent of GDP in 1991, which is higher than most
developing countries and even some OECD countries like New Zealand and
Ireland (FRD 1993). However, unlike most OECD countries, in South Africa R&D
has been directed towards national security objectives in the fields of defence and
energy, and has only to a small extent been driven by economic motives.13
Moreover, civilian spin-offs from such research have been relatively fewer than
in other countries with astrong defence industry.14 Hence, aremarkably
sophisticated technological capacity not expected to be found in a deve!oping
country has been built up in production of weapons, fighter aircraft, nuc1ear
energy, computers, electronics and radiation therapy to mention a few (Branscomb
1994). However, as Branscomb (1994) points out, defence and commercial
markets are not highly compatible and good performance in the first is no
guarantee for success in the latter. Furthermore, South Africa has, for security
13 In USA defence-related industries have been an important driving force for technological
development. This fact has, however, from time to time caused concern as Japanese products
became market leading in a number of industries.
14 Tegart (1994) finds the situation similar to the Eastern European countries which allocated
excessive resources to defence-related activities to gain military advantage over the West.
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reasons, to a large extent developed such technologies in isolation, while high-
technology industries elsewhere are characterised by intraindustry trade (see
section 4.1). Therefore, the cost structure of South African high-technology
industries has only to a limited extent been tested against world market
competitors.
In the field of energy, self-sufficiency was the objective of R&D efforts, resulting
in, among other things, the path-breaking synfuel technology developed by the
parastatal Saso!. However, although synfuel might be impressive from a
technological and engineering point of view, it is expensive and not what the
world market wants. The trend in the world market is rather to develop additives
which allow for unleaded fuel to maintain the efficiency of leaded fue!. Unleaded
petrol is stil a few years away in South Africa (Jourdan 1993). Hence, due to lack
of consideration for the market, South Africa has developed a significant
technological capacity that to some extent is out of touch with consurner
preferences.
The challenge facing South Africa as the high-technology industries are exposed
to world market competition and investor demands for reasonable returns on their
assets, is to trans form such industries while maintaining their technological
capacity. However, within energy and defence industries successful innovations are
extremely costly, and it is the absolute leve! more than the share of GDP that
determines the results. In order to maintain the technological capacity without
draining an unacceptable amount of resources from an already stretched
government budget, finding foreign partners, licensing or buying R&D services
abroad are probably the only viable solutions. Finding partners might be difficult
since South African high technology in many cases seems somewhat out of pace
with cost-efficient technologies developed elsewhere.1s Transformation may thus
be a prerequisite for attracting foreign investors and for participation in
international networks.
This section has outlined a framework for analysing the interrelationship between
technology, comparative advantage, trade patterns, sector allocation of output and
economic growth. I wil now proceed by analysing the structure of the South
African manufacturing sector along the three dimensions suggested in section 2.1.
3. Output structure of the South African manufacturing sector
In this section I wil first give a snapshot of the structure of the manufacturing
sector in 1990, and after that analyse the trends since 1972. Table 3.1 shows the
15 Several technologies developed in South Africa are pointed out to be the only of its kind in the
world. In some cases, this probably means that South Africa is at the technology frontier in the
field. In other cases it means that the technology, although extremely sophisticated, coexists
with other, more cost-efficient and perhaps even simpler technologies that meet the same ends.
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percentage distribution of value added in manufacturing industries along the
wage/technology dimension as classified by OECD.
Table 3.1
Value added in manufacturing industries, South Africa 1990
(percentages); OECD c1assification
High MediumWage/
Technology
High
Medium
Low
Total
1.66
10.51
13.75
25.92
2.03
13.28
30.20
45.51
Low Total
3.73
1.25
23.58
28.56
7.42
25.04
67.53
100.00
Source: CaJculated from IDC (1992). Scientific instruments was given as part of "other
manufacturing", and petrochemicals were lumped together with "other basic chemical products"
(ISIC code 3511) in the IDC data, which were therefore supplemented by trade statistics from
Customs department and CSS's "South African Statistics" to estimate the data for these two
subsectors.
One feature of the South African economy that immediately catches the eye is the
asymmetry depicted in this table. The figures in the cells fallng under the
diagonal (from upper left-hand to lower right-hand corner) are significantly larger
than the part above the diagonal, i.e. industries in which the wage leve! is
supported by other factors than the technology leve! dominate. This becomes even
c1earer when applying the same method of classification along the wage dimension
for the South African wage structure as that of the OECD.16
Table 3.2
Value added in manufacturing sector 1990
(percentages), South African wage structure
High Medium LowWage/
Technology
High
Medium
Low
Total
6.95
20.00
31.79
58.75
0.47
4.06
7.56
12.10
Total
0.00
0.97
28.18
29.15
7.42
25.04
67.53
100.00
Source: calculated from IDC (1992)
16
"High wage" ;: 15% above the manufacturing average, "low wage" -: 85% of manufacturing
average.
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While the bulk of manufacturing employment is found in the medium-wage
industries in OECD, it is the smallest category in South Africa, accounting for
only 14.3 percent of total employment and 12.1 percent of output.1? Assuming
that relative wages reflect differences in skil1evels, the polarity characterising
South African sector distribution along this dimension is explained by the dual
education and training system, inc1uding very limited prospects for career
development for black workers (Pilay 1993). Lack of career opportunities also
implies that there are no incentives to acquire additional skils on the shop floor.
As can be expected in a semi-developed country, next to no high-technology
industries earns low wages.18 However, a larger number of low-technology
industries earn relatively high wages in South Africa than in the OECD.19
17 Medium-wage industries constitute between 44 percent (Canada) and 56 percent (Netherlands)
of total manufacturing value added in 1989 in OECD (OECD 1993).
18
The only exception is scientific instruments, which accounts for a tiny share of total output.
19 High wage industries in SA are in addition to those included in table 3.1: paper and printing,
iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, non-electrical machinery, electrical machinery,
communication equipment and semiconductors.
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Figure 3.1
Remuneration costs in $ per hour, manufacturing sector, 1993
UK
US
o 5 io 15 20 25
Source: NPI
The absolute wage level in the manufacturing sector compared to OECD and other
developing countries is given in figure 3.1. As can be seen from this figure,
employees in South Africa earn more in terms of remuneration per hour than
colleagues in OECD countries like Mexico and Portugal even though GDP per
capita is twice as large in Portugal and around 70 percent larger in Mexico
compared to South Africa.20 Comparisons converting the average wage in local
currency into USD at the going market exchange rate conceal the large wage
differentials ilustrated by table 3.2, and do not take into account purchasing power
in local currency.21 Nevertheless, it is obvious that such labour costs have to be
founded on equally high labour productivity if sustainable in a competitive market,
be it the domestic and regional market in a more liberal trade regime, or the world
market.
Labour productivity is simply output per worker employed or output per man-hour,
and may increase through several channeIs: Adding more capital per worker wil
improve labour productivity, but at a declining rate if the standard assumption of
dec1ining marginal product of factors of production is applied. In South Africa this
source of improving productivity has been used extensively; the capital/labour ratio
for manufacturing as a whole has increased from a capital stock of about R 25,000
per worker in 1960 to R 74,000 per worker in 1992, both figures at constant 1990
prices.22 This capital deepening was accompanied by an improvement in labour
productivity from around R 25,000 value added per worker in 1960 to R 42,000
per worker in 1992, or an average annual growth of 1.6 percent. Over the same
period the output to capital ratio dec1ined from around 1 in 1960 to 0.55 in 1992,
or an annual average dec1ine of 1.8 percent.23 Hence, the marginal product of
labour has been increasing over the period, while the marginal product of capital
has dec1ined, as predicted by neoc1assical growth theory.
Increasing the stock of human capital embodied in the labour force improves the
productivity of both labour and capital as workers develop skils to utilise new
capital equipment more efficiently and solve problems as they arise on the shop
floor. Productivity growth through this channel has been largely foregone in South
Africa. Years of schooling of the economically active population is far below the
OECD countries, but also below Asian and Latin American countries such as the
Philippines and Chile (NPI 1994). Although the average number of years of
20 Source for remuneration data: National Productivity Institute (NPI), source for GDP per capita:
tables included in chapter 10 of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995). GDP per capita in 1990,
calculated at constant 1985 USD is 3,193, 5,376 and 6,520 for SA, Mexico and Portugal
respectively.
21 In a perfect world equilibrium exchange rates do reflect purchasing power. Besides, customers
do not care about the purchasing power of the wages earned in producing the goods they buy.
22 Source: CSS for employment data, Reserve Bank for data on capital stock.
23 Author' s calculations based on data from the Reserve Bank on capital stock and value added,
and CSS on employment.
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schooling was relatively high compared to countries like Portugal and Mexico in
1960, these countries are rapidly catching up with South Africa as can be seen
from table 3.3.24 Moreover, numerous studies have documented a very low
quality of education for the black population. For example, Rustomjee (1993) finds
firms in which 50-75 percent of the workforce is iliterate even in medium-
technology manufacturing industries like the engineering industries. The World
Bank (1994) ilustrates the situation as follows: "Out of every 10,000 African
children who enter the school system, 1,300 wil reach matriculation, 113 wil
pass, 27 wil qualify for university acceptance and 1 wil qualify for university
acceptance in either mathematics or science."
South Africa
Mexico
Portugal
South Korea
Taiwan
Chile
Table 3.3
Average number of years of schooling
1960
Male
4.06
2.69
2.41
4.58
4.49
5.20
1985
Male
5.51
4.8
4.29
9.17
8.23
6.55
Female
4.07
2.13
1.54
2.04
1.85
4.80
Female
4.43
4.06
3.43
6.59
5.65
6.36
Source: Table 10.1 in Barro and Sala-i-Marin (1995).
There is abundant evidence that investment in human capital has been of low
priority also in the business sector. For example, when licensing agreements
provide an opportunity for transferring technology through training by the licensor,
Kaplan (1991) finds that the opportunity is not utilsed. This neglect of skill
accumulation has probably had a serious impact on productivity in South African
manufacturing. After all, physical capital is not operating on its own, but has to
be matched by adequately skilled labour. A sharp increase in the capital/labour
ratio with relatively sophisticated imported technology embodied in new capital
(Kaplan 1991), combined with poorly skilled labour is therefore likely to lead to
a mismatch of factors of production.
Further research is necessary to establish the optimal trajectory of physical and
human capital accumulation in the South African economy, given the economy's
present factor endowments. It is nevertheless very likely that the social return on
24
Average number of years of schooling for South Africa in 1960 is probably somewhat
overstated, since the "Independent homelands" are not included in the statistics. However, data
from South African sources, for instance Pilay (1990), confirms that the figure was
significantly above Mexico and Portugal.
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investment in human capital is much higher than the return on investment in
physical capita1.25 Investment in human capital does, however, give high rates of
return only in the long run. And even then the return is likely to accrue to the
individual being educated and the society as a whole rather than the firm investing
in its labour stock.26
Pinally, other factors like scale economies, new technology embodied in the capital
stock, better infrastructure and better organisation contributes to productivity
growth. The impact of such factors is best captured by total factor productivity
(TPP). This is the most important source of income growth in developed countries.
In developing countries, on the other hand, capital deepening and structural change
are more important, and TFP growth is usually of less significance. Even in the
Asian NICs, capital deepening was the most important source of growth over the
period 1966-1990. In Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan TPP accounted for 30,
12 and 20 percent of observed growth during the period respectively, while TPP
growth was negative for Singapore during the same period (Barro and Sala-i-
Martin 1995). These are figures for the economy as a whole. However, TPP in a
long-established manufacturing sector as the South African, could be expected to
grow significantly. This sector has constituted more than 10 percent of GDP since
the 1920s and more than 20 percent of GDP since the early 1950s. In spite of
South Africa's relatively sophisticated infrastructure, the contribution was negative
during the period 1981-1990, while only 0.4 percent of actual growth in the
manufacturing sector could be explained by growth in TPP during the period 1960
to 1992.68.5 percent of observed growth was accounted for by increase in the real
capital stock and 31.1 percent by increased employment.27
We have now seen that neither the technology level nor accumulation of human
skils account for the relati vely high real wage leve! in South Africa. Classifying
industries according to orientation sheds more light on which factors contribute to
the income level, and whether it is sustainable in a competitive environment.
25 1'he social return on black education is estimated at between 6 and 18 percent, depending on
the method applied and the period over which it is estimated (Hosking 1992). In comparison,
a rough estimate of the private rate of return on physical investment (net operating surplus as
a share of total fixed capital stock for the economy as a whole in 1990) was around 7 percent.
26 The dominance of a few conglomerates in South African industry may however reduce the risk
that a competitor reaps the benefit from intra-firm training.
27 Author's calculations based on data from the Reserve Bank and CSS.
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Table 3.4
Value added in manufacturing by orientation, South Africa 1990
Orientation Share of VA, % V A per worker
Resource intensive 38.15 R46000
Labour intensive 16.06 R22000Specialized supplier 10.75 R41 500
Scale intensive 32.91 R49 500Science based 2.13 R43 500
Source: calculated from IDC (1992).
According to the above table as much as 70 percent of manufacturing output is
either resource- or scale-intensive. These are the industries with the highest value
added per worker. Only 16 percent is labour-intensive. Thus, labour costs are not
the decisive factor determining competitiveness for the majority of South African
manufacturing industries. Or, put differently, just as in the OECD relatively high
labour costs can be compensated by high productivity. In South Africa's case a
high productivity potential stems from either scale economies or access to relative-
ly cheap raw materials and energy. Let us therefore examine productivity perfor-
mance along the three dimensions mentioned above over the last two decades:28
Table 3.5 shows that productivity performance has been very poor during the
period 1972-90 for the manufacturing sector as a whole, as well as for most
categories as c1assified along the wage, technology or orientation dimension.
Along the wage dimension, TPP performance deteriorates with rising wage leveIs.
As can be seen from columns 5-8 in the table, labour productivity, and hence
wage leveIs, are strongly related to capital intensity. Consequently, TPP turns out
to grow slower the more capital intensive the industry. Looking at individual in-
dustries, TPP contribution to growth is related to a moderate capital deepening. In
low-wage industries, capital deepening was moderate and TPP accounted for al-
most 50 percent of output growth during the 1970s. During the 1980s the positive
trend in TPP growth was reversed, and even labour productivity dec1ined slightly.
In medium-wage industries, moderate capital deepening has led to improved TFP
over the entire period. Although TPP contributed less to total output growth in
these industries than in the low-wage ones, its contribution increased from the first
to the second period. However, as opposed to the trend in low-wage industries
28
TFP is calculatedbymeans of a standard growth accounting method: The equation
ln(A(T)/A(t)) = ln(Y(T)N(t)) - ta*ln(K(T)/K(t)) + (l-a)ln(L(T)/L(t))
where Y is real output, K real capital stock and L number of employees, T and t are end and
beginning of period respectively, and a is the period average capital share. This method is based
on the assumptions that capital and labour are paid according to the value of their marginal
products, and the production function exhibits constant returns to scale. Neither is likely to hold
in South Africa, so the results mus t be considered indicative only.
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where the capital/labour ratio increased from adding more capital stock, capital
deepening came mainly from shedding labour in medium-technology industries
during the 1980s, and labour productivity improved as aresult.
High-wage industries are characterised by tremendous capital deepening, parti-
cularly during the 1970s followed by a substantial dec1ine in TFP. During the
1980s, even labour productivity dec1ined sharly. The worst performers were the
motor vehicle industry and petroleum refining. The former is scale intensive, but
highly protected and inward oriented.29 Besides, the industry is highly frag-
mented. Seven manufacturers are competing mainly on the domestic and regional
markets, producing 11 makes and 34 models in 1993. While minimum efficient
scale per plant is assumed to be in the range of 150-200,000, the South African
motor industry produced 198,000 vehicles combined in 1991 (Black 1993). Hence,
satisfying consurners ' preference for variety in a stagnant economy has not
allowed for efficient scale, a factor that has contributed to the disrnal performance
of the motor vehicle industry. Petroleum-refining productivity has probably
suffered from the fact that parts of the sector are being operated for strategic
rather than economic reasons. Nevertheless, a combination of protection and an
exceptional increase in the capital/labour ratio is responsible for petroleum refining
(and other basic chemicals) having the highest average wage leve! in South
African manufacturing industries in 1990.
Along the technology dimension, TFP has, in fact, contributed most to growth in
high-technology industries, followed by aminor, but increasing contribution in
low-technology industries and slowing down growth in medium-technology indus-
tries. In high-technology industries, as in low-wage industries, TFP improvements
followed a moderate capital deepening, leading to a more productive input mix.
The relatively good performance in high-technology industries again reflects the
duality of the South African economy. In the midst of strongly resource-based or
Fordist-type industries, pockets of high-technology industries like pharmaceuticals,
computers, semiconductors and even aircraft are found.30 Moreover, one of them,
computers and office equipment, is strongly export-oriented. High-technology in-
dustries have a relatively low capital intensity, but is strongly human capital in-
tensive. In spite of the fact that skil shortages are identified as the major con-
straint to most manufacturing industries (CEAS 1993), the high-technology indus-
tries seem to have been able to match sophisticated machinery with human capital.
29 The nominal rate of protection for completely built up units is 115 percent.
30
"Fordist-technology" was introduced in the car assembly industry in USA to be able to produce
large quantities at low costs with an unskilled and of ten multilngual workforce.
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Table 3.5 Source. of arowth, manufacturtna
(l) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) O) (8)
Growth rate Contrtbutlon Contrtbutlon TFP arowth K/L bea. K/L end V/L bea. V/L end
net output from capltal from labour rate perlod perlod Pertod perlod
i
Total manufacturtna
1972-1981 5,48% 3.02% 1,99 0.47% 36528 56910 31627 38931
1981-1990 -0.27% 0.47% -0.26% -0.49% 56910 65511 38931 39521
--
1972-199 2.60% 1.83% 0.82% -0.05%
By wage cateaory I
low-wage Industries
1972-1981 6,10% 1.47% 1,71% 2.92% 19377 21559 1864 25217
1981-1990 -0.35% 1.32% -0,20% - 1.47% 21559 30308 25217 25161
1972-199 2.88% 1.39% 0.75% 0.73%
Medlum-waae Industries
1972-1981 4,72% 2.03% 2.08% 0.61% 47372 58702 36492 41649
1981-199 -0.05% 0.09 -0.43% 0.29% 58702 63891 41649 44169
1972-199 2.33% 1. 10% 0.79% 0.44%
i
hlah-waQe Industries
1972-1981 6.18% 6.04% 2.66% -2,52% 6633 168625 65757 76530
1981-199 -0.69% 0;50% -0.10% -1.09 16825 187311 76530 73344
1972-199 2,74% 3.67% 1.14% -2.07%
By teChnology cat~
Low-technoloQY Industries
1972-1981 5.22% 3.51% 1.68% 0.03% 38305 67854 27706 3468
1981-199 0,59% 0.38% -0.14% 0.34% 67854 74894 34648 37353
1972-199 2.90 2.08% 0,72% 0.10%
Medlum-technoloav Industries
1972-1981 5.84% 1.33% 2.71% 1.79% 34077 32404 44900 51804
1981-199 -2.40% 0.94% -0.53% -2.81% 32404 44022 51804 44984
1972- 199 1. 72% 1.13% 1.09 -0.50%
HIQh-technoloav Industries
1972-1981 6.34% 1.77% 3.01% 1,56% 23313 26527 32757 39226
1981-199 0.28% 0.56% -0.83% 0,55% 26527 34715 39226 44826
1972-199 3,31% 1.17% 1.08% 1.06%
By ortentatlon
Resource Intensive
1972-1981 5.65% 5.84% 1.35% -1.55% 40841 95375 31254 41030
1981- 199 1.72% 0.94% 0.18% 0.61% 95375 10670 41030 46193
L 972- L 99 3.69% 3.61% 0.72% -0.64%
Labour intensive
1972-1981 4.94% 0.82% 2.07% 2.04% 13196 13231 19928 23973
1981-1990 - 1.84% -0.22% -0.71% -0.91% 13231 13410 23973 22177
1972-1990 1.55% 0.29 0.69% 0.57%
Speclallsed sup piler 
1972-1981 5.52% 1.53% 3.29% 0.69% 20568 22033 39277 42640
1981-199 -2.18% 0.29 -1.35% -1.12% 22033 28619 42640 41570
1972-199 1.67% 0.92% 0.97% -0.21%
Scale Intensive
1972-1981 5.68% 2.08% 2.25% 1.35% 67912 81030 43537 52531
1981-199
-:Q~~~. 0.28% -0.16% -1.00% 81030 88789 52531 49695
1972- 1990 2.40% 1.18% 1.05% 0.18%
Science based
1972-1981 4,17% 1,04% 2,33% 0.80% 28879 37714 37769 42574
1981-1990 0.11% 0.03% -0.08% 0,15% 37714 38528 42574 43389
1972- 1990 2.14% 0.64% 1.07% 0.42%
y= neloutDut. K = capital stock. L = labour force (number of emplyees)
Growth rate of net output: averoae over the perlod I
Contrlbutlon from capitalis the product of capltal share and the growth rate of capltallnput
Contribution from labour Is the product of the labour share and the arowth rate of labour Input. ,+----
Capltal and net output per worker are alven as R 1000 (199 prlces) per worker I l i
I i
I
i i.~
Source: Author's calculatlons based on data from IDC (1992) I ! T----~_.-
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This somewhat rosy picture needs, however, to be qualified. Although TFP may
have improved over the period in question, absolute levels are discouraging. Net
output per worker has been lower than in medium-technology industries during the
entire period, although the gap has narrowed. Some, mainly defence-related
industries, had a negative gross operating surplus over most of the period analysed.
Moreover, the relatively good export performance found in IDC data is contra-
dicted by Hirsch (1993), applying his own, "c1eaned-up" dataset. Hence, because
data on trade and production in defence-related high-technology industries are not
easily available, they are subject to guesswork, and results must be interpreted
with great caution. Finally, it has been sugge sted that the defence industry gives
sophisticated equipment as gifts to foreign countries or sells it at large rebates.31
Along the orientation dimension, perhaps surprisingly, the labour-intensive
industries have perforrned best, followed by science-base d industries. TFP made
a small contribution to real output growth in scale-intensive industries (in spite of
the disrnal performance of motor vehic1es), but slowed down growth in resource-
intensive industries as well as industries in which product differentiation is the
most important competitive factor. Looking at the two time periods, science-based
industries are the only ones experiencing TFP growth in both periods, while TFP
contributed positively to growth in resource-based industries during the second
period. For the latter, changes in productivity probably has a lot to do with
fluctuations in commodity prices, since trade margins, and hence operating surplus
to a large extent varies with commodity prices. Science-based industries overlap
with high-technology industries to a large extent, and the qualifications made for
the latter apply to the former as well.
From this analysis it is c1ear that TFP growth is associated with moderate capital
deepening, while a sharp increase in the capital/labour ratio is followed by
dec1ining TFP. We interpret this result in the light of the new theory of economic
growth (Romer 1986 and 1989) and numerous growth accounting studies.32 This
body of research explains theoretically and finds supporting empirical evidence
that aneeessar condition for exploiting the possibilities offered by technological
progress is employment of new machinery and equipment in which this technology
is embodied, combined with a higher leve! of skill and education to understand
and apply the fruits of technological progress. If capital deepening is not
accompanied by skill accumulation, it runs into diminishing returns. In South
Africa, the science and engineering workforce grew faster than the total workforce
during the last decade (FRD 1993), but skil accumulation has been insufficient
to increase the capital/"efficient labour" ratio, except for a few industries. Another
factorthat contributed to diminishing returns is the fact that some large investment
31
Personal communication with A.S. Mint y , former director of "World Campaign against military
and nuclear collaboration with South Africa".
32 A recent study is Mankiv, Romer and Weil (1992).
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projects have been implemented for strategic reasons rather than on the basis of
economic viability . Finally, and strongly related to this, large investments in new
capacity, producing for a stagnant domestie market, have led to low capacity
utilisation and hence disrnal productivity performance.
The slight improvement in TFP following moderate capital deepening can either
have been achieved by upgrading labour skills following the introduction of new
or improved production technology, or by introducing machinery that facilitates
better utilsation of existing skils through more extensive specialisation. Judging
from various indicators of investment in human capital which were discussed
above, and from several sector studies pointing to a Fordist-type production
technology, division of labour and other organisational changes are likely to have
contributed most to TFP growth in low-technology industries. In medium-
technology industries, upgrading skills has probably been a necessar, but
neglected precondition for further productivity gains, leading to dec1ining TFP in
spite of moderate capital deepening. Since a large share of medium-technology
industries is scale-intensive, inefficient scale following inward orientation and
small and stagnant domestic and regional markets has also contributed to the
decline in TFP.
From this analysis, two potential sources for future productivity growth recovery
can be identified. The first is exploitation of economies of scale, which in turn
requires a larger market. Where existing capacity is be!ow minimum efficient
scale, scale economies can be improved either through large-scale investment in
new capacity or by concentrating production on fewer varieties. Large-scale
investments in new capacity runs the danger of cernenting the existing industrial
structure. This would be the case particularly if combined with costly investment
incentives and further protection, perhaps within a regional framework like SADC.
In that case it would only have a temporary effect on productivity as moving from
inefficient to efficient scale provides an increase in productivity leve l, but only a
short-term increase in the productivity growth rate.
Concentrating on fewer product varieties would probably require less investment
in physical capita!. Some of the motor vehicle producers, for example, have close
to minimum efficient scale capacity.33 Combined with scaling down the leve! of
protection (see section 4.2) this would open for intraindustry trade and enhanced
competition: Locally produced varieties would have to compete with imported
versions on the home market to a larger extent than at present, and a larger share
of production would have to be exported out of the region. Due to the ownership
structure of South African industry with some six conglomerates dominating the
manufacturing sector as well as the entire economy, foreign competition is likely
to be the most fierce. Intraindustry trade would also facilitate output as well as
33 VW has according to Black (1993) a capacity of 120-130,000 vehicles.
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productivity growth through a greater variety of inputs as discussed in section 2.1,
and possibly a faster adoption rate of new varieties The latter is probably
dependent on South African companies becoming a part of international networks,
be it a foreign parent company or joint ventures.
The second, and probably most important source of further productivity growth in
the long run is investment in human capita!. Such investments should, however,
be accompanied by investment in physical capital for two reasons. Firstly, low
levels of investment during the last decade has rendered the manufacturing sector
with a somewhat outdated capital stock (Maasdorp and Whiteside 1993). Secondly,
upgrading skills leads to a dec1ine in the capital/"efficient labour" ratio. To the
extent that this ratio is on or below the optimal ratio, investment in physical
capital must accompany investment in human capital to maintain or increase this
ratio.34 However, building a sufficiently large human capital base from a low
initial leve! may take decades, while growth in the short term is important,
particularly in an economy where expectations are high and the consequences of
frustration probably severe. Therefore, a faster route to income growth is likely to
be opted for in the short run. With rising commodity prices as world economic
recovery gathers momentum, investment is likely to flow to commodity-based
industries. This trend is already observed with large-scale investment in an
aluminium smelting plant (Alusaf), and a world scale stee! mil, ISCOR's
Columbus project.
So far the structure of the manufacturing sector is analysed in terms of allocation
of output, represented by value added. This structure is to a large extent
determined by resource endowments, comparative advantage and trade policy. I
wil, therefore, analyse trade patterns by sector in more detail in the next section
before jumping to conclusions regarding the sustainability of the present size,
structure and wage level in the manufacturing sector.
4. Trade
As is typical for natural resource-rich countries, South Africa has run a surplus on
the balance of trade for long periods of time, while trade in manufactures has been
in deficit most of the time. Table 4.1 shows trade patterns in 1990 along the three
dimensions applied throughout this paper. This trade pattern wil be compared to
OECD patterns and the likely outcome of trade liberalisation wil be discussed in
the next two sections.
34 A study by Van Zyl, Kleynhans and Bruwer (1994) finds that in the motor vehicle
manufacturing industry, the capital/labour ratio is by far below the efficient rate (i.e. the ratio
that equates the ratio of marginal products to the ratio of factor prices.
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4.1 Trade patterns involving the OECD countries
In OECD countries import penetration measured along the wage dimension is
highest for high-w age industries and lowest for medium-w age industries.35 Along
the technology dimension, import penetration does not differ very much between
high and medium technology, but is significantly lower for low-technology
industries. Apart from "food, beverages and tobacco", the industries for which
import penetration is the lowest are the lo w-technology , medium-wage industries.
However, in these industries import penetration has increased over the last decade
in the G7 countries.36 For iron and steel, which is of particular relevance to South
Africa, import penetration increased substantially during the 1980s to the benefit
of developing countries like Brazil, South Africa and South Korea (Jourdan
1993).37
Exports as a percentage of produetion are higher than the manufacturing average
for high-w age industries and dec1ining with average wage costs. Along the
technology dimension high technology industries have the largest export share in
the USA, United Kingdom and Japan while medium-technology industries have
the highest export share in the other G7 countries. The difference among high- and
medium technology is small, however, while the export share of low-technology
industries is much lower than for the other two categories. For the United States,
for example, the export share of total manufacturing was 9.9 percent in 1989,
while the distribution on technology categories was 18.2, 12.5 and 4.5 percent on
high, medium and low technology respectively. The G7 share of total world
exports in manufacturing industries c1assified along the technology dimension is
given in table 2.1 and along the orientation dimension in table 2.2. The share is
generally very high in the manufacturing sector, and it is increasing with the wage
leveL. Along the orientation dimension it is increasing from a relatively small share
in labour-intensive industries to totally dominating the world market for science-
based manufacturing industries.
Bearing in mind the concern of OECD countries about unemployment and the fact
that they are relatively rich in both physical and human capital, such a trade
pattern talles with the product cyc1e described above. Thus, world trade in high-
technology products is dominated by the OECD countries selling such products to
. eachother. As less. developed and Jower-cost countries catch up with the no-
longer-so-new technology, OECD countries protect, subsidise or support the
restructuring of maturing, medium-wage industries so as to prevent job losses. This
is why import penetration is low for this part of the product range. Industries such
35 All data in this section are taken from OECD (1993) if not otherwise stated.
36 The period 1980-1989 (1988 for some of the countries).
37 Import penetration in iron and steel industries rose from 0.8 to 2.7 percent in Japan, from 15.5
to 24.1 percent in Germany and from 22.1 to 28.5 percent in France, to mention the largest
increases.
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as c10thing and textiles, import-sensitive electronics and stee! are, for example,
excluded from the EU's General System of Preference (GSP). However, as the
competitive pressure from low-cost countries increases, protection becomes too
costly and is therefore scaled back. The formerly protected industry is then either
eliminated, or the OECD country is left with only an up-market proportion of the
product range of the industry. Thereafter, import penetration rises. The garment
industry is an ilustrative example of such a product cyc1e. Like the textile and
garment industry, most industries inc1ude standard, low-technology, mass-produced
goods alongside specialised, up-market products. Technological progress therefore
takes place in all sectors, but the pace, the extent and the characteristics of the
markets vary widely among sectors.
4.2 South Africa's trade patterns
In contrast to the OECD countries, import penetration increases with the wage
leve! in South Africa, in spite of the fact that the effective rate of protection
increases with the wage level as well. This indicates that South Africa is very
unlikely to have comparative advantage for high-w age industries. Moreover,
looking at the effective rate of protection, the unit labour costs are probably too
high even in low-wage industries compared to foreign potential competitors. Along
the technology dimension, import penetration increases with technology leve!,
while protection is highest for medium-technology industries and lowest for high-
technology industries. The relatively low leve L of protection in high-technology
industries is probably explained by the limited endowment of human capital in
South Africa that makes import substitution in such industries extremely costly.38
Except for the most labour-intensive low-technology industries, the leve! of
protection is moderate in this category, at least compared to other developing
countries, sugge sting that with lower factor prices, South Africa could become
competitive on domestic and external markets following the implementation of
GATT rules in these industries.39 Along the orientation dimension, import
penetration is relative ly low for resource-intensive industries compared to other
categories along this dimension in South Africa, as well as compared to most
OECD-countries. Import penetration in labour-intensive and scale-intensive
industries is also relatively low, reflecting comparative advantage as discussed
above, and a relatively highJevel of protection. Specialised supplier and science-
based industries have high levels of import penetration and low levels of
protection reflecting lack of comparative advantage and high cost of protection.
38 Protection of high-technology industries could be underestimated in this table due to large share
of high-technology industries for which data are not available and the embargo that "protected"
domestic high-technology defence-related goods.
39 Labour-intensive industries with high rates of protection are "spinning, weaving and knitting"
and "clothing" with effective rates of protection of 104 and 239 respectively.
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Table 4.1 I COMPETITVENESS INDICATORS, 1990
i
Trade Export Import Effective rate
Name of sector Exports Imports balanee share penetration ' of protection
Food. beverages, tobacco 3106 1872 1234 7.6% 4.7% - 17 - 55
Textiles, apparei, leather 2651 2065 586 19.4% 15.8% -26 - 239
Wood products 547 303 244 11.8% 6.9% 37 - 44
Paper and printing 1009 144 -437 7.% 10.6% 15 - 22
Chemicals excluding drugs 753 3467 -2714 6.4% 23.9% 21 - 348
Pharmaceuticals 137 1059 -922 6.0% 33.2% 24
Petroleum refining 2719 5215 -2496 13.2% 22.5% na
Rubber and plastic products 193 597 -404 3.0% 8.7% 56 - 215
Non-metallic mineral products 484 838 -354 8.5% 13.8% 25 - 34
Iron and steel 5683 986 4697 36.7% 9.1% 27
Non-ferrous metals I 2286 315 1971 36.4% 7.3% 16
Metal products
i
811 1766 -955 6.2% 12.6% 27 ~-
Non-eleclrical machinery 831 7906 -7075 9.9% 51.2% 2
Computers and office equipm 20 1973 -1953 40.8% 98.6% na
Electrical machinery 271 2881 -2610 3.7% 29.0% 22
Communication equipm. and semiconduct 121 1890 -1769 4.5% 42.5% na
Shipbuilding 129 212 -83 35.8% 47.9% 2
Other transport equipment 100 336 -236 29.6% 58.5% 2
Motor vehicles 712 6416 -5704 5.4% 33.8% 46
Aerospace 44 1100 -1056 10.2% 73.9% na
Scientific instruments 204 2246 -2042 31.% 83.3% na
Other manufacturing 1045 375 670 62.1% 37.1% na
Total manufacturing 23856 45264 -21408 12.6% 21.5%
Low wage 7720 7832 -112 11.30% 11.44% -26 - 239
Medium waae 11751 18202 -6451 16.25% 23.11 % 2 - 215
High wage 4385 19230 - 14845 9.05% 30.38% 21 - 348
Low technology 17139 14703 2436 13.44% 11.76% -26 - 239
Medium technology 5920 19412 - 13492 12.28% 31.47% 2 - 348
High technology 797 11149 - L 0352 5.95% 46.93% 22 - 24
Resource intensive 9142 8543 599 11.72% 11.04% -17 - 55
Labour intensive 4507 4206 301 15.84% 14.94% -26 - 239--
Specialized supplier 1223 12677 -11454 6.65% 42.49% 2 - 22
Scale intensive 8579 13460 -4881 14.09% 20.47% 2 - 348
Science based I 405 6378 -5973 L 1. 90% 68.03% 24
_.
Sources: IDC (1992) and Hirsch (1993)
Effective rates of protection are calculated for the period 1988-90 at four-diait ISIC level
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Export coverage figures for one year must be interpreted with caution, since they
may be affected by special circumstances like export incentives and the absolute
dec1ine in domestic expenditure starting in 1990 and continuing through 1993.
Bearing this qualification in mind, export coverage was highest for medium-wage
industries and lowest for high-w age industries, while it was dec1ining with
technology leve!, reinforcing the anticipation that South Africa's comparative
advantage lies in low-technology, low-to medium-wage industries. Finally, along
the orientation dimension, labour-intensive industries have the highest export
coverage followed by scale-intensive and science-intensive industries. It should,
however, be noted that the differences among the five categories along this
dimension, except for specialised supplier, are rather small, so no c1ear conc1usion
can be made on export patterns along this dimension. The largest exporting
category, resource-intensive industries, come next to last in terms of exports as a
share of production, reflecting a large domestic market for the output of these
industries, mainly as inputs to other industries. It should also be added that South
African companies have engaged in large investments abroad mainly in mining
and mineral-related industries, suggesting that they hav~ a highly competitive
technology. According to these observed trade patterns, South Africa has revealed
comparative advantage in low-technology, medium-wage and resource-based
industries.4o
One important structural difference between OECD and South African trade
patterns is worth noticing. As ilustrated in table 4.2, there is a strong positive
correlation between import penetration and export coverage along all three
dimensions for the OECD countries, here represented by the USA, while the
correlation is negative for South Africa. The negative corre!ation is particulary
strong along the technology dimension, indicating that this is a highly relevant
dimension for international division of labour as far as South Africa is concerned,
while the strongly positive correlation indicates that it is not for the USA, nor for
the other advanced OECD countries. Hence, in South Africa trade is mainly of an
interindustry character at this leve L of aggregation, facilitating static gains as a
result of more efficient international division of labour, but 1eaving less scope for
the dynamic gains related to intraindustry trade.
40 Import penetration is a very simplistic indicator of comparative advantage, but stil provides an
indication that in this case accords with other empirical evidence as discussed in this paper.
29
__________.___m___.J
I
I
Table 4.2
Correlation coefficients between export share and import penetrationDimension USA South AfricaLabour costs (wage) 0.94 -0.17Technology 0.91 -0.90Orientation 0.35 -0.43
Source: Calculated from OECD and IDC data.
Implementation of the new GATT agreement means lower levels of protection
both in South Africa and the OECD countries. In South Africa, relative prices wil
change in favour of resource-intensive, low-technology industries, and some of the
labour-intensive, low-wage industries, while liberalisation wil most significantly
affect medium-wage, low-technology industries in the OECD. Hence, the
industries that gains from liberalisation in South Africa match fairly well with the
markets to which access is about to improve in OECD. This is, however, no
guarantee that South African industries wil be able to make inroads into the
OECD markets, as long as there are third countries with similar comparative
strengths as those of South Africa relative to the OECD countries. Competition in
low-technology industries is growing more intense as emerging market economies
enter the world market with low wage costs, state-of-the-art technology imported
from the OECD countries, skiled labour being able to operate the technology
efficiently and access to markets allowing them to operate on an efficient scale.41
South Africa is probably at a disadvantage compared to these countries both in
terms of wage costs (see figure 3.1) and technology, and has to reduce unit costs
substantially in order to increase world market shares for standard, low-technology
manufactures. In resource-intensive industries, on the other hand, South Africa has
developed state-of-the-art technology in some of the mining and mineral
beneficiation industries (Jourdan 1993), and is likely to benefit from better market
access to the OECD. Besides, mineral beneficiation is energy-intensive, and South
Africa has low energy prices, although probably subsidised.
if South Africa is granted Lomé Convention terms for entry to the EU market,
competition from Asian non-ACP countries wil ease somewhat.42 As the general
leve! of protection is being reduced and an increasing number of countries,
particularly the Eastern and Central European transitional economies, are given
preferential access to the EU market, the significance of the Lomé Convention wil
be diminished. There are also doubts as to whether the Lomé Convention wil be
extended beyond the year 2000 when the current one expires. Therefore,
41 Even in low-technology industries rather sophisticated technology is embodied in machinery
equipment that requires an ever increasing minimum level of skills in the course of
technological development to be efficiently operated.
42 ACP countries include African, Caribbean and Pacific former European colonies.
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preferential access to the EU countries wil only provide temporary breathing
space for South African manufacturing industries.
Trade liberalisation wil increase the scope for economies of scale in industries
like motor vehic1es, chemicals and paper and printing. As far as the latter is
concerned, South Africa is an important player on the world market through
foreign direct investment. Motor vehicles as well as other industries with
significant technological potential have, however, not revealed comparative
advantage according to a study by Hirsch (1993). Substantial restructuring would
therefore be necessary for these industries to survive trade liberalisation. The likely
outcome of liberalised trade with the OECD countries is therefore resource
allocation towards food processing and more or less beneficiated minerals
including related down-stream activities. This would reinforce the complementarity
between South Africa and the OECD. Since the OECD economic structure entails
more prornising prospects for technological progress, interindustry trade may
widen the technology gap in the lon g run, although all parties wil gain from a
more efficient resource allocation. In addition, there is some scope for increased
intraindustry trade in the resource-based industries. Worldwide they are
differentiated both vertically and horizontally, and there is scope for both moving
up the quality ladder and gain from a wider range of intermediate inputs through
trade even in resource-based industries.
4.3 Trade patterns within Southern Africa
Due to the limited data available, it is difficult to analyse the breakdown of
regional trade by sector. However, rough "guesstimates" suggest that Africa is a
very important market for South African manufactures, particularly the medium-
technology, high-w age industries that were found uncompetitive on OECD
markets. Hence, at least 25 percent of South Africa' s manufactured exports went
to African markets while 28 percent of total exports of chemicals and 27 percent
of motor vehicles and parts went to non-SACU African markets in 1985. Non-
SACU Africa is an even more important market for medium- technology, medium-
wage industries like machinery (36 percent of total exports) and plastic and resins
(46 percent of total exports) (African Development Bank 1993).43
The prices of a wide range of exports to the Southern African region were in 1992
15-25 percent above the fob prices of comparable goods from elsewhere (Leistner
1992). The reasons why South Africa has been able to sell over-priced goods to
its neighbours are partly preferential access to their markets, which is particularly
the case for theSACU countries, and parly non-price advantages sl.ch as shorter
43 In addition there are exports to the SACU countries. In South African and international offcial
trade statistics, SACU is treated as one area, hence South African trade with SACU partners
is treated as domestic trade in the statistics.
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delivery times and easier credit terms (Davies 1993). Whether more appropriate
technology is another factor contributing to the relatively high market share
probably needs further research to establish. Black (1993), however, suggests that
South African-made cars are adapted to the special conditions in Southern Africa,
and Römer-Heitman (1992) suggests that South African-produced miltary equip-
ment is particularly designed with the geographic and c1imatic conditions in Africa
in mind. While natural protection wil prevail in future, implementation of a more
liberal trade regime in the SADC countries wil imply that South African
industries wil face increased competition on these markets from the OECD and
overseas developing countries as well.
South African membership in SADC wil improve its access to regional markets.
Such membership may also secure South Africa access to markets overse as on
terms similar to that of the other SADC countries. The least favourable option is
to be granted GSP terms in trade with the OECD countries while the most
favourable option is to join the Lomé Convention as discussed above. An
intermediate sol uti on is to include South African products as originating products
in the ACP countries under the Lomé Convention which in turn would stimulate
intra-regional trade (Trade Monitor No.7 1994).
Increased emphasis on regional trade and cooperation is important and even crucial
in fields like transport and communication, energy and environmental issues to
mention but a few. However, looking at the significance of the regional market for
medium-technology manufacturing industries, the scope for basing recovcry on
exports to the region in these industries is limited. Besides, managing trade
towards the region in excess of what wil emerge from removing remaining
obstacles to intra-regional trade has several caveats: SADC is one of the slowest
growing areas in the world with low purchasing power, paricularly for high value
added manufactures. Managed trade within the SADC framework is likely to
faciltate division of labour along the technology dimension, as was the case with
liberalisation of trade with the OECD countries, but this time South Africa would
have comparative advantage for medium and a few high-technology products
relative to SADC trading partners (African Development Bank 1993). Although
this could create some well-paying jobs in South Africa and provide an
opportunity for somewhat improving the scale efficiency of the industries in
question, they would meet limited competition from SADC firms. Consequently,
SADC is not likely to constitute the dynamic and competitive market that would
drive technological development by moving up the quality ladder, even though a
more liberal trade policy wil make some difference in this regard.
Increasing exports to the SADC countries would prompt counterdemands of
increasing imports from these countries in order to diminish South Africa's large
trade surplus versus SADC. To the extent such imports are competitive, a
reorientation towards regional markets would emerge as a result of lower trade
barriers and benefit all parties. Jf it is not, "managed" reorientation would not only
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impose a cost on consurners or firms importing intermediates, but also represent
foregone opportunities for technology transfer through a greater variety of
intermediates embodying new technology. This argument also applies to the SADC
countries if South African goods are not competitive in a neutral trade regime.
Consequently, SADC (and possibly PTA) membership is not an alternative but
rather complementary to a more open trade policy towards the OECD countries,
and developing countries in Asia and Latin America.
The African Development Bank (1993) found that countries such as Zimbabwe
and Kenya are competitive in the region as well as the world market for a range
of labour-intensive, low-technology industries. Moreover, Zimbabwe is found to
have a better trained and educated semi-skilled labour force than South Africa.
Therefore, a trade and investment pattern that may emerge in a regional free trade
area or common market is an increase in South African direct investment in SADC
low-technology, low-wage industries which in turn would export to the South
African as well as regional and overseas consurner markets. This would indeed
reduce South Africa's large trade surplus while providing capital and jobs to
neighbouring countries. Poor infrastructure, small market size and foreign
exchange constraints are, however, likely to pre vent an exodus of such South
African industries. In addition, a possible outflow of investment may be
counterbalanced by repatriation of firms that established themselves in
neighbouring countries to countervail sanctions during the 1980s (Maasdorp and
White side 1993).
Increased South African investment in the mineral sec tor in the region is another
likely effect of strengthened regional cooperation. South Africa has developed
state-of-the-art technology in the mining sector and is in a good position to further
develop the rich mineral resources in Southern Africa. To the extent that resources
rather than world demand is the limiting factor on the South African mineral
beneficiation industry , this would in turn facilitate investment in large-scale
beneficiation and processing plants in South Africa as minerals could be imported
over relatively short distances and provide feedstock for scale-efficient plants. Due
to high transport costs of unprocessed minerals, some beneficiation would
inevitably take place in the SADC host country. South Africa already has one
plant based on imported ore, takng advantage of low energy costs and local
know-how, the Alusaf project.
Hence, given that South Africa is relatively rich in capital, economic infrastructure
and to some extent human capital compared to regional trading partners (except
Zimbabwe), a more liberal trade regime in the region is likely to lead to a division
of labour in which an increasing share of mineral processing is done in South
Africa, alongside production of medium-technology manufactures, while an
increasing share of the region's labour-intensive, low-wage, low-technology
industries is located in the other SADC countries, perhaps by means of South
African capita!.
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In this section it has been argued that when embarking on a free trade regime, the
existence of comparative advantage for resource-based industries is bound to cause
an increase in the share of such industries in the economy as competition with the
OECD countries (and other relatively advanced countries like the Asian NICs) is
likely to take its toll on high-technology industries, while competition with low-
cost regional as well as Asian and Latin American producers is likely to eliminate
parts of the labour-intensive low-technology industries.44 Removing trade barriers
in the Southern African region would facilitate trade and foreign direct investment
within the region. The region would probably also become more attractive for
foreign direct investments from extra-regional sources, since such investments
would serve a larger market. Despite this, the region is not likely to constitute a
springboard for a significant increase in South African manufacturing's market
share in overseas markets.
4.4 Consequences for economic growth
In a perfectly competitive economy, resources are allocated among sectors in such
away that marginal product to the last unit of capital and labour employed is
equal in all sectors. Therefore, sector allocation of resources is not an issue in
standard growth models. South Africa is, however, not a perfectly competitive
economy, and it cannot be assumed that the marginal products of the factors of
production are the same throughout the economy. Therefore, structural change wil
influence economic growth in South Africa. The structural change likely to follow
a change in relative prices in favour of resource-based industries, is an increasing
share in GDP of resource-based industries. Simulations on a computable general
equilibrium model for South Africa predicted the same outcome - a reduction in
tariff protection gave an increased share of mining and resource-based industries
in GDP (Naude and Brixen 1993). These industries are mainlY' in the low-
technology category.
On the one hand such reallocation of resources would lower the technological
potential of the manufacturing sector, and probably the economy as a whole. This
would mean that the capacity to imitate would be limited to products and
proeesses that have reached a mature state. Without significant reductions in unit
labour costs, existing protected industries, as well as industries moving from
OECD countries to South Africa, wöuld also have to be scale- intensive since
labour costs are less important for competitiveness in such industries. if this is the
structure of the manufacturing sector that emerges from reintegration into the
world economy, the prospects for economic growth based on technological
progress would appear to'bebleak. The steady-state incoine growth path would be
lower than in countries with comparative advantage in industries with higher
technological capacity. On the other hand, South Africa is probably far away from
44 Unless unit labour costs declines substantially.
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such a steady state, so there should be room for a transitionary spurt in growth
after a period of restructuring.
Jf South Africa is able to reduce unit labour costs through a spurt in productivity
growth, lower real wages, or both, labour-intensive industries could expand as a
response to access to broader markets as wel1. Jf they do so at the expense of
medium-to-high-technology industries, this would again contribute to a lower
technological capacity of the economy. Even in this case, some qualifications must
be made with respect to the conc1usion that this would unambiguously reduce the
prospects for long-run technology-driven growth. Firstly, as discussed in section
2.4, the technological capacity of the South African manufacturing sector may be
less impressive than anticipated. If so, there is not that much technological
capacity to lose in the event of high-technology industries being partly or totally
wiped out. Moreover, maintaining such capacity may be more costly than the
South African government is wiling or able to pay in terms of subsidies,
protection and R&D expenditure. Secondly, if labour-intensive industries became
more competitive, employment in the manufacturing sector would increase. In an
economy with very high unemployment and a large informal sector, this would
mean that total employment would increase. If this formal-sector employment
effect outweighs the income effect following lower average real wages, real output
would increase as wel1.
Whether the income or the employment effect dominate, is an empirical question
that calls for further research. The prospects for actually reducing average real
wages are dependent on, among other things, the strengths of the trade unions and
the development of the exchange rate. As far as the latter is concemed, there is
an upward pressure (i.e. for appreciation) in periods of rising commodity prices,
which seems to be the consensus forecast for the near future. The need to control
inflation by means of relatively high interest rates points in the same direction.
Pointing in the other direction is the possibilty of abolishing the financial Rand.
In that case the unified exchange rate would probably settle somewhere between
the financial and the commercial Rand, implying a depreciation of the latter.
However, this would be a one-off effect. Hence, even if more sectors are exposed
to international competition, booming resource-based industries are still likely to
crowd out some import-competing industries, limiting the extent of the
employment effect.
To conclude this section, South Africa is a developing country in spite of some
pockets of high-technology industries. The prospects for a recovery in economic
growthfollowing reintegration into the world economyin the short run depends
on the ability to exploit the comparative advantage for resource-based industries
and economies of scale in these industries. However, the ability to catch up with
at least the poorest OECD countries, depends first and foremost on having the
social capabilties to imitate and adopt new technologies. Perhaps the most
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important element of such socIal capabilties is a well-educated workforce. To
quote Nelson and Wright (1992: 1959),
Convergence (towards the US income level) has occurred among those nations with modern
educational systems, strong internal scientific and engineering communities, and
sophisticated industrial enterprises. Nations without these attributes have tended to fall
farther and farther behind the frontiers. There are now few technological secrets, but it takes
major investments of many kinds to command a technology.
Further research is necessary to establish how far South Africa has fallen behind,
and to assess the prospects for catching up if the structural change predicted in
this study materialises.
5. Conclusions
South Africa is a mineral-rich country and as such has inherited comparative
advantage in resource-intensive industries. As is common for mineral or oil-rich
countries, South Africa has a cost leve! that is not justified by productivity
performance stemming from technological development. South Africa can afford
such co st levels without running into balanee of payment difficulties because of
mineral rents. To be able to sustain such income (and cost) leveIs, South Africa
has tried to create comparative advantage by protecting import-substituting
industries, particularly in the medium-technology category. The potential for a
rapid spurt in productivity growth through catching up with technology-Ieading
countries is large in these industries, but the social capability to capitalise on this
potential has been inadequate. In addition, there has been lack of incentives as
industry demands for more protection have been successful most of the time.
Finally, unexhausted economies of scale due to a small market has contributed to
the disrnal productivity and growth performance. Or to put it in terms of the
product cycle framework, South African manufacturing industries have been able
to imitate medium-technology products, but not at a lower cost than the
innovators.
Promoting medium-technology manufacturing industries can be justified
theoretically on the grounds of distortions leading to suboptimal market solutions.
Dynamic effects like larger technology potential and more generic technology in
other sectors have been identified as one distortion that can justify such
interventions. Another is the fact that miner als are assets inc1uded in the national
wealth portfolio, and mineral rents should be transforrned to high-yielding assets
like technological capacity in order not to deplete total wealth. The first best
correction of this latter distortion is to tax the revenue from mineral rent. Holden
(1992) shows that the import-substitution policy, which from the early 1970s was
combined with export incentives, has indeed constituted an implicit tax on the gold
mining - industry.
36
The dynamic distortion represented by accumulation of generIc technology, or
technology spilovers takes place across national borders as well as between firms
and industries within a country. Technology spilovers across borders are related
to imports through technology embodied in products and services, direct
investments through transfer of process technology as well as work organisation
and exports through exposure to technology possessed by competitors and standard
requirements set by customers.45 Hence, this distortion calls for stimulating trade
and foreign investment in medium-and high-technology industries with generic
properties, not necessarily just export promotion.46
The new South Africa stands on the doorstep to full participation in the world
markets. What makes this situation difficult is the fact that all these measures,
except faciltating trade as such, have been tried rather unsuccessfully as the above
analysis has shown. Hence, income earned mainly from minerals has been invested
in sophisticated infrastructure and high-technology industries with meagre results
in terms of productivity growth. While investment-Ied growth followed by
relatively slow TFP growth is common in newly industrialised countries, TFP
growth has picked up when protection was gradually scaled back as new industries
"grew up". To facilitate "growing up" the NICs - particularly South Korea -
invested heavily in human capital (see table 3.3). In South Africa, protection has
not dec1ined to any significant extent. To the contrary, in a wide range of
industries the effective rate of protection has increased since 1985 (see Hirsch
1993). Thus, South Africa finds itself burdened by overprotected "young adults"
rather than "infant" industries. The infant industry protection argument for
continuing on an inward-oriented trade and industry policy, even if SADC is
included in the "home" market, is therefore weak.
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